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Forming of New Elites: 
The Hungarian Case 
Károly Szabó ∗ 
Abstract: »Bildung neuer Eliten: Der Fall Ungarn«. Among the Central-East 
European transition countries the Hungarian economic trajectory seems to de-
viate from the others. The high state redistribution resulted in a malfunctioning 
welfare state. The existing level of state involvement is a consequence of the 
elite settlements of the early transition period. Privatization involved over-
whelmingly foreign capital and avoided “shock therapy”. Both policies have 
contingent effects on the existing elite configuration. An exploration of the 
economic elite identifies different segments with specific interests in state re-
distribution. The political and the economic elite have both evolved to coexist 
with a high disparity of incomes and a strong presence of foreign capital ac-
cordingly. 
Keywords: transition, privatization, Visegrad countries, Hungary, elite seg-
ment, redistribution, foreign direct investment (FDI), elite settlement. 
1. The Identification of the Economic Elite 
An exploration of the role of elites requires, to some extent the identification of 
the elite. My starting point in this identification is the definition of elite in the 
new elite paradigm.1 In case of the economic elite, these are the individuals “... 
who can effectively influence the reproductive processes of the national econ-
omy with their decisions and are incumbents of relevant institutional posi-
tions.”2 This definition is simple and straightforward, but becomes more diffi-
cult as we attempt to delineate the circle of concrete persons belonging to the 
elite based on this simple definition. 
Usually, theorists differentiate between elite fractions and segments. In this 
paper, this separation simply indicates two dimensions of grouping individuals 
belonging to the elite. An elite fraction is defined basically according personal 
attitudes and relations, political opinions, trust network, cultural background 
etc. Elite segments can be identified through the institutional framework or 
according the division of labor. 
There is a deep-rooted debate on the subject whether the elite is a statistical 
artifact or a collective actor. Standing between the disputing parties I tend to 
                                                             
∗  Address all communications to: Károly Szabó, Talaj utca 28, 1112 Budapest, Hungary; 
e-mail: krosza@gmail.com. 
1  Higley 2006.  
2  Lengyel 2007. p. 97. 
Historical Social Research, Vol. 35 — 2010 — No. 2, 13-40 
 14
suppose that both the elite fractions and segments often behave as collective 
actors. They might have common interests and they are capable of collective 
action. The segments and fractions portray the elite in two dimensions. Belong-
ing to a fraction does not necessarily define one’s position in an elite segment 
and vice versa. As the notion of elite fractions is rather connected to politics, 
elite segments – which reflecting the structure of the institutional framework – 
are in the focus of this paper. 
Using basically the positional approach in the first round I tried to explore or 
define the elite segments, on the basis of the division of labor. This approach, 
however, is deficient in terms of power, therefore it needs some kind of itera-
tion and also regrouping. One may ask whether a group of persons has common 
interests. Are they capable of collective actions? Additionally to the division of 
labor, another variable seemed useful to apply. In most cases, the elite person 
has the command position of a key institution. But who owns the institution? 
The answer is quite often decisive. Thus ownership relations of the concrete 
elite position may be an important element. What is the ultimate role of the 
elite person, owner or manager? This dimension, the independency factor, may 
be the second variable to the classification of the elite segments. Considering 
these dimensions and the history of the last twenty years of the Hungarian 
transition, certain groups are emerging which may qualify to be recognized as 
an elite segment. In the following I attempt to present certain points of the 
above mentioned iteration process. 
2. Some Specifics of the Transition 
2.1 Transition countries in general 
There were massive differences in the transformation of the centrally planned 
economies in terms of pace and methods, not to speak about the societal out-
comes. If we concentrate on the opportunities of the elite, how they obtained 
ownership and control over the assets of a country in the new economic institu-
tional framework, the differences are quite spectacular. As regards the big 
picture of the transition countries, A. Walder’s analysis seems appropriate to 
draw on. 3 He has differentiated four types of transitional economies, defined 
by regime change, policy and regulatory environments. In line with these cate-
gories the economies of Poland, Hungary and Czech Republic represent Type 1 
transition. Although Slovakia was omitted from this study, presumably because 
of the lack of data, I would also include it in this transition type. 
According to Walder, the main characteristics of this type of transition in-
clude that the communist hierarchies collapse, losing assets and the powers of 
                                                             
3  Walder 2003. 
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appointment. The ruling party shrinks into an electoral party and loses early 
elections. Systematic privatization is orderly and well regulated. These circum-
stances were effectively limiting opportunities for asset appropriation by the 
old elites. The transition had its effects on elite circulation, too. “High rates of 
elite turnover in both political and economic organizations” took place and the 
old elites had limited mobility into new, propertied and corporate elites. “Those 
with higher education and skill were more likely to survive in elite salaried 
posts.” Walder is focusing on the opportunities of old elites, which issue has 
somehow played a central role in the transitional literature from the very be-
ginning. Different theories were formed, verified and disproved. To sum up this 
transition type: “Early and rapid democratization followed by well regulated 
privatization sharply curtails elite opportunity”4 and this more or less follows 
the early empirical findings of comparative research by Szelényi, Wnuk-
Lipiński, Treiman 5. 
The above categorization is undoubtedly true; however it probably portrays 
too general a picture about these processes. Comparison with e.g. China, Rus-
sia, Kazakhstan, or Vietnam may be misleading. These countries clearly have 
characteristics very different from those of the central European transition 
countries. To better understand the prevailing situation of the latter countries, it 
seems reasonable to elaborate (i) the differences among them and (ii) to certain 
extent, shift the empirical focus from the circulation or reproduction of elites to 
the institutional trajectories, namely to the question of how the elite positions 
are defined and reproduced in a society. More precisely, how the institutional 
conditions influence elite behavior and segmentation. 
2.2 Transition differences among the Visegrad countries 
The specifics of the Hungarian case may be grasped more easily if we concen-
trate on the Visegrad countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovak 
Republic). There are of course many similarities between these countries and 
the transformation of the former GDR, now East Germany, (see e.g. Best 2007 
or Scheuch 2003), but, because of the strong West German influence on the 
transformation any comparison would be inappropriate or deceptive. These 
countries shared a very similar fate in the last 50 years or so, have akin cultural 
heritage etc. It is also true that “The present social and cultural-civilizational 
structures of the societies in question can be characterized as a hybrid combina-
tion of surviving bureaucratic and egalitarian, and new meritocratic and class 
relationships”6. The transformation of the institutional framework also has 
many common elements; nonetheless the differences among them are signifi-
                                                             
4  Walder 2003, 914. 
5  Szelenyi, I., E. Wnuk-Lipiński and D. Treiman 1995. 
6  Machonin et al. 2007, 68. 
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cant if we look at some factors which determine the elite’s elbowroom in capi-
talistic market economies. 
2.2.1 Transformation differences 
The Visegrad countries faced similar problems, might have had similar phases 
of transition7 and have usually been classified as one group. It is correct that 
Despite the significant policies of destatisation, the post-communist societies 
all share in common a higher level of state control than market capitalist coun-
tries ... The average amount of internally-sourced investment … is even below 
the average for low income countries...8  
Although the weight of the common attributes is significant, the transformation 
of the institutional structure resulted in very different outcomes (see below) 
even among the Visegrad countries. 
The elites play a key role in the political and institutional transformation, 
and it is highly probable that this role is far more decisive than simple interme-
diation between national and external forces.9 Elite attitudes, norms, behavior 
and actions may determine the speed and trajectories of transformation – the 
different privatization methods chosen by the countries’ elites have greatly 
influenced the economic politics and problems of these countries in the 90’s. 
Paradoxically, the paths chosen by these elites later determined an institutional 
framework which, in some cases, deeply undermined freedom of the elites in 
question. 
This short paper focuses on the Hungarian case in comparison with the three 
others. The specifics of the Hungarian transition case can be summarized as 
follows:  
- different starting point 
- a sound elite circulation in the 1980s 
- different pace of transition 
- different preferences of economic policymakers 
                                                             
7  “This historical process has been until quite recently realized in two phases roughly deter-
mined by changing geo-political contexts. In the first of them (from 1990 to 1997), under 
the key influence of the neo-liberal stream in world politics and economy, occurred a transi-
tion to the democratic parliamentary political system and rapid radical economic and social 
changes. In many cases it occurred with application of the so-called shock-therapy, or at 
least of some of its elements. The subsequent economic difficulties and social tensions 
caused in the last third of the 1990ies mark the start of the second phase.” Machonin et al. 
2007. p. 67. 
8  Lane 2005, 244. 
9  See for example Pakulski ‘s Sandwich concept. 
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a) Starting point 
The Hungarian institutional transition already started in the early 80’s. As an 
early bird, by 1989 Hungary had: 
- a rather decentralized although state owned enterprise configuration, 
- a comparatively advanced two tier banking system, with (later very 
badly) functioning commercial banks, 
- a market oriented taxation regime, 
- a more or less sufficient market orientated legal framework for the econ-
omy (company, bankruptcy and joint venture laws), 
- a fairly strong foreign direct investment (FDI) inflow, 
- close connection to and participation in the international monetary com-
munity (e.g. IMF, World Bank) 
- a “reform minded” staff even at the top or almost at the top level of key 
central administrative institutions, such as the Ministry of Finance, Plan-
ning Office, National Bank. 
b) Elite circulation  
Parallel to the early signs of transformation the elite circulation accelerated in 
Hungary. Empirical studies show that “the economic elite, and especially the 
bank and ministry leadership, was considerably rejuvenated in the late 
1980s.”10 This new elite played a critical role in the transformation and also 
preserved its position after the changes. “The decisive majority of Hungarian 
economic leaders – some three-quarters – have had a constantly and gradually 
rising career, despite the political change.”11 
c) Pace 
As a consequence of the above circumstances a spontaneous privatization12 of 
certain branches of the economy was already under way even before the actual 
transition (mostly through joint ventures and/or “outsourcing” profitable activi-
ties of state owned enterprises). A decisive political intention existed to curtail 
this process as quickly as possible, because it provided opportunities practically 
only to the incumbent entrepreneurial cadres of the old regime, a clear trait of 
elite reproduction. Also, the spontaneous privatization provided no revenues to 
the budget, indeed it was even very costly to the budget. The old company parts 
                                                             
10  Lengyel 2007, 99. 
11  Lengyel 2007, 101. “A representative survey consisting of managers and political leaders in 
1993 pointed out that three-quarters of the managers of large enterprises were in some lead-
ing position already in 1988, while in the case of the political elite this proportion was 60%. 
Other research (Kolosi 2000, 103) clarified that “two-fifths of the market-oriented elite of 
the second part of the ‘90s was recruited from the former redistributive elite.” 
12  Laky 1992. 
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left behind were in many cases bankrupt as a side effect of this kind of privati-
zation. The new government reacted quickly with direct sale of the state owned 
companies to strategic investors as the preferred method of privatization, 
mainly with the assistance of foreign capital. By the end of the 90’s Hungary 
was in a relatively advanced position in terms of the privatization of state 
owned enterprises and the financial sector (banks and insurance companies). 
d) Preferences 
Due to the spontaneous privatization (to stop or limit it) and political will, 
Hungary had chosen a straightforward and a relatively speedy way of the priva-
tization. The dominant technique was the direct sale of the state owned enter-
prises to strategic foreign investors.13 Interestingly, sooner or later the biggest 
companies were privatized with the same end result in the three other countries 
although they started with other methods. If spontaneous privatization had 
prevailed, policy-makers believed that the representatives of the socialist re-
gime would have been able to survive in great numbers, which was not the 
objective of the new political elites. The lack of local capital and potential 
strategic investors (unlike in Germany) forced the Hungarian governments to 
rely almost entirely on foreign capital. Although re-privatization did have some 
role, from the elite point of view it did not give rise to elite positions among the 
beneficiaries. 
2.2.2. Institutional Differences – Different Trajectories 
Besides the common characteristics of the post-socialist countries:  
- a higher level of state control, 
- low level of internally-sourced investment, 
- modest level of stock market capitalization 14 
 
It is worth looking at the differences in the Visegrad countries. The differ-
ences on the macro (institutional) level may explain the variation in elites’ 
structure. Among the several possible distinctive elements (the vast of eco-
nomic and societal variables) certain institutional differences can be grasped 
easily if we look the extent of the government and the foreign presence in the 
economy, business life and in the elite groups. 
First look at the role of the state in these countries. The success of the trans-
formation of a command economy is usually measured by the share of the 
private ownership in production, commerce etc. The countries in question show 
no significant deviation from the market economies and from each other in this 
                                                             
13  Gál 2005. 
14  Lane 2005. 
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respect. These countries were frontrunners among the post-socialist regimes as 
far as privatization and the regulatory environment was concerned. On the 
production side, no clear tendencies can be found e.g. in the weight of the state 
owned enterprises. However, GDP centralization (redistribution) shows some 
interesting figures to talk about. 
a) Redistribution 
The ratio of redistribution of GDP, which seems at first glance meaningful, 
may be misleading without the knowledge of the context. If we compare for 
example the centralization level of Germany and Hungary we may suppose that 
in the former the state has an even stronger function with all the negative con-
sequences we consider typically a post socialist phenomenon.15 A closer look 
however reveals that the similarities end with the ratios. Undoubtedly, similar 
amounts of money are centralized and spent, the differences are nonetheless 
huge. This is a matter of how a state taxes and spends and what happens to the 
tax proceeds. In case of Hungary, we might not be facing a newer kind of wel-
fare state, which Esping-Andersen could not take into consideration when he 
outlined the different types of welfare states.16 While it is a widespread belief 
that Hungary is a welfare state, growing numbers of researchers are doubting 
its orderly functioning.17 Simply looking at some macro variables in OECD 
comparison one may recognize serious deviations from an ideal welfare state.18 
It seems more adequate if we compare this (redistribution) in respect of the 
four chosen states. The time series data reveals a very interesting and at the 
same time significant tendency variation among these economies. The data 
demonstrate a clear-cut difference between Hungary and the other three. Since 
2001, Hungary has been having an increasing redistribution trajectory, different 
from the others. They all have a decreasing state involvement (see Figure 1). 
This should again be put into context. First, it has to be mentioned that Hun-
gary was just in the opposite position in the 1980s. With a considerable black 
economy (25-30% of GDP) and a market-oriented, fairly autonomous corporate 
structure, a considerable part of the income stayed with the state owned enter-
prises. Hungary was almost a quasi market economy by the end of the 1980s. 
                                                             
15  “With around 50% of the spending from the GNP being directed by public bodies, there 
exists in Germany a strong interdependence between private firms and politically super-
vised institutions. Political parties and individual politicians appear to have an insatiable 
appetite for money, and firms are dependent on administrations and politicians. The de-
pendency is strongest where contracts are passed by public bodies, if a license or an excep-
tion is needed for doing business, and if subsidies are required. There is a thin line between 
politicians in their current position as the brokers between private interests and public 
money, and outright corruption.” Scheuch 2003, 31. 
16  Esping-Andersen, 1990. 
17  See Sajó 2008, Szalai 2007, Kátay 2009. 
18  see Table 5. Life Expectancy and Redistribution in some OECD Countries 2003.  
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Secondly if we look at the details (Appendix, Table 1) we will see immediately 
the specifics of this deviation. The Hungarian “surplus” is spent mainly on two 
functions: general public services and social protection. In the discussed period 
only Hungary increased the social protection expenditures. The other three 
succeeded to decrease these expenses considerably. In case of the two functions 
one can easily find the “elite connection”. Mainly because of political reasons: 
(i) Hungary operates the largest state administration (the costs, 9,3% of the 
GDP in 2007, are more than double of the other’s), (ii) and the unresponsive 
social spending was a major election strategy of the last two elections.  
Figure 1: Total Government Expenditure per Gross Domestic Product  
2001-2007 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: OECD Statistics. 
b) The Role of Foreign Capital 
The role of the foreign capital has been debated since the beginning of the 
transformation. Unfortunately, the discussions sometimes get nationalistic 
overtones, which greatly hinders the objective evaluation of this issue. At first 
glance (Figure 2.) it is obvious that the involvement of foreign capital in Hun-
gary is significantly higher than in the other three countries. 
This picture is still valid if we look at the FDI/GDP ratios. Probably it is not 
necessary to argue that this high level of FDI in the Hungarian case (apart from 
the size of the country) has nothing to do with the high levels of Switzerland, 
Ireland or the other Western countries with similar high levels of FDI. This 
high level corresponds to a conscious line of past elite decisions and former 
policies. 
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The positive effects of FDI in Hungary are accepted even by the local com-
petitors19 and – apart from the extreme right politicians – there is a widespread 
consensus that, in the given situation, (post-socialist transition) there were 
limited opportunities for any other approach to solve the problem of “creating 
capitalism without capitalists”. However, agreeing with the common consent 
one must recognize the trade-offs, too20. From our point of view, the most 
important consequence of the strong foreign position lies in the configuration 
of the elite. Interestingly enough, what is remarkable is not the fact that manag-
ers controlled by foreign capital occupy the most important command positions 
in the economy, but the reactions of the national political and business elites. 
How do they counterbalance this situation? What kind of arguments and meth-
ods are used? What kind of structural specifics can be identified in the elite 
configuration? Before discussing the Hungarian elite structure it is useful to 
review shortly how the economists/sociologist evaluate the societal situation 
these days. 
Figure 2: Per Capita FDI position, 2007 (USD’000) 
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Source: OECD Statistics, for details, see Appendix, Table 2. 
2.3 Societal Consequences 
There is a general consensus among economists and sociologists that certain 
social and economic problems are getting more and more serious in Hungary. 
Currently, the extent of the tax evasion can be estimated at between one quarter 
                                                             
19  Laki 2007. 
20  1995 the net transfer of capital income to abroad in was 4% of GDP, that rose to 8% of 
GDP by 2008. 
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and one third of GDP.21 The extreme low level of employment (economically 
active population) compared to the other European countries is closely related 
to the high rate of redistribution. Tax regulation is extreme complicated, (at 
present the number of different kind of taxes is 53) giving rise to a huge admin-
istrative burden for taxpayers.22 The high state redistribution became the target 
of the rent seeking attitude and behavior in the society.23 
The performance and functioning of the so called welfare state can be ques-
tioned, the growing disorder and disarray in the economy result in legal norms 
losing their power.24 The extensive participation of the state in the economy is a 
bad mutation25 and a heritage of the socialist regime. Beside the high centrali-
zation, the state operates with a formidable complicated and wide array of 
regulation which effectively restricts the small and medium sized enterprises26 
and in general any venture. The high budget deficit and the concomitant high 
level of indebtedness of the country are acute problems which lead to serious 
financial crises from time to time. It is a growing concern that the excessive 
redistribution is creating a kind of undesired dependence. 
Some statistics unmistakably underpin the above statements. The ultimate 
measures of the welfare situation demonstrate a sober picture. Stagnation in the 
life expectancy is apparent. Hungary lags behind its peers (Appendix, Table 
5,). The acutely low level (about 20% of the 18-65 years old) of the employ-
ment of the Roma population since the beginning of nineties may explain and 
may have been responsible for the growing racism and the strengthening of the 
extreme right, even fascist movements. 
3. Elite Consequence: Structure of Economic Elites 
The following are hypothetical statements on the structure of economic elites, 
based on the interviews so far and available data on economic elite positions. A 
further investigation is necessary to underpin them. 
a) Economic Policy 
From the beginning of 1990’s concerning the economic policy the most impor-
tant “elite settlements”27 and compromises forming the economic elites were 
the following:  
                                                             
21  Krekó-Kiss 2007. 
22  Kátay 2008, 5-6. 
23  Szalai 2007. 
24  Sajó 2008. 
25  Muraközy 2008. 
26  Török 2007, 2008. 
27  The notion of elite settlements used in this paper slightly differs from that of discussed by 
Higley and Burton in their widely cited article (1987). They used this concept describing 
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- fast privatization of state owned enterprises, through direct sale to foreign 
investors, 
- in the same time retaining control in the energy sector, 
- fully liberalized commercial banking, maintaining monopoly position for 
OTP in retail banking, and parallel limiting of Hungarian individuals and 
non financial firms to minority positions in banking,  
- tax holidays to foreign “strategic investors”,  
- preserving the “accomplishment s” of the socialist welfare system, 
- only soft “shock therapy” to the citizens. 
The new Hungarian elite have been in the making since the early eighties.28 
The young and middle aged professionals filling non elite positions in the cen-
tral governmental institutions (ministries, banks) played an important role in 
the transition of 1990. On the one hand several of them have become senior 
bankers, or held top positions in the administration and we can find them even 
among the richest Hungarians (see below). On the other hand they have influ-
enced or formulated the economic policies of the new governments since 1990. 
For various reasons, the economic policy of the majority of economic policy 
makers was a specific mixture of neo-liberal and socialist welfare theories. The 
generally accepted ideology was that Hungary should follow a horizontal tra-
jectory, demonstrated by the simplistic figure below, and become a western 
type market and welfare economy. 
They argued for and followed a quick privatization and market liberalization 
trajectory on the one hand, but wished to maintain a high level of welfare ser-
vices on the other hand. In reality the welfare services has never been high but 
egalitarian, the same (low) level to everyone who were not in an elite position. 
Another element of socio-economic policy, to make the transition velvet like, 
was the high level of income redistribution in the form of various money trans-
fers to the population. The successive political courses were keen to follow this 
irrational economic policy, a perverse mixture of quasi liberal and communistic 
concepts. 
                                                                                                                                
the agreements between warring elite fractions which might pave the way to stable democ-
racies. In the context of this paper I use it describing the stable and long lasting agreements 
among elite segments. (i.e. between political and economic elite segments). 
28  “All things considered, the replacement of the Hungarian economic elite considerably grew 
in the latter half of the 1980s, prior to the change of the political and economic system.” 
Lengyel 2007, 110. 
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The huge administration, the extensive centralization and distribution, the 
state run welfare services29 needed to maintain several “economic” elite posi-
tions which had nothing to do with a market economy. The holders of these 
economic elite positions have been the greatest advocates of state redistribu-
tion. According to even the most recent studies, the majority of the populations 
are strongly in favor of paternalistic ideologies, which makes these elite posi-
tions particularly strong. No wonder that the high budget deficits and high 
centralization of GDP became a norm in Hungary during the last 20 years. 
Since the end of the 1990s (mainly due to privatization and later because of 
the continuous increase in foreign involvement in the Hungarian economy30) 
foreign capital has played a dominant role in the economy (see Figure 3.). 
Figure 3: Division of the 200 Largest Companies by Ownership, 2007 
(Financial sector excluded) 
Ownership Number of Companies Net Sales M HUF  
Foreign  153 76,5% 19 097 157 71,2% 
Public/Stock Exchange  10 5,0% 4 399 896 16,4% 
State or municipality owned 13 6,5% 1 730 242 6,4% 
Domestic private 23 11,5% 1 571 885 5,9% 
Other 1 0,5% 39 699 0,1% 
Total  200 100,0% 26 838 879 100,0% 
Source: <http://www.fn.hu/top_200_46/>. 
 
As the shares of the publicly listed companies are held mainly (some 75%) 
by foreign investors we can assume that today more than 80 % of the 200 larg-
                                                             
29  Some cases the hypocritical element is astonishing. In Hungary the healthcare services are a 
mixture of black and gray “wild” market and centrally planned economy. The real market 
and competition is legally excluded in the majority of the health care services. 
30  See: Laki-Szalai 2004, 157. 
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est companies (by net sales) are controlled by foreign strategic or financial 
investors. Among the 50 largest there is only one state owned and one domestic 
privately owned company. If we include the financial sector the picture is the 
same. The commercial banks – except OTP (see later) – are owned by foreign 
banks and the situation is the same in the insurance sector. Looking at the bulk 
of the enterprises the foreign presence is still decisive. 31 Some 60 % of the 
registered capital belongs to foreign entities. 
The interests of the foreign investors are quite diverse and so is their distri-
bution by country of origin. Yet, there is one group which emerges from the 
mass of the foreign controlled companies, and these are the biggest ones. This 
group enjoys different tax treatment i.e. lower taxation (although not very 
transparently). Their managers and organizations have constantly been engaged 
in bargaining and lobbying with politicians and the administration. 
In lack of concrete empirical information about the managers of foreign 
owned companies some indication can only be drawn from the results of Intune 
research.32 The managers of the multinationals and foreign owned companies 
are, as a rule, well trained, have internationally accepted knowledge, at least 
half of them have international experience (studying or working abroad), their 
attachment to the European Union is strong. 
The leaders of the largest foreign controlled companies considered to be 
members of the elite, act under paradoxical institutional conditions. They com-
pete in a market where competition is not really the norm. They have to lobby 
constantly to preserve their preferential treatment in the tax regime (allow-
ances, grants etc) and in the regulatory framework, to maintain their monopo-
listic position guaranteed formally or informally by the authorities. Their activ-
ity strongly supports a quasi-capitalist system, which is quite different from 
that prevailing in the countries of their parent companies, from their actual 
employers’ homeland. Their personal interest is, in most cases conforming to 
their employers’ interests, to be profitable, thus to maintain the existing institu-
tional framework. 
b) Elite Segments 
When classifying the elite, we need to accept compromises. Some part of it will 
always be in the shadow and the media and the publicly available data distort 
or misrepresent their internal structure (i.e. who is important or “Who 
rules…”). The borders of the elite in any kind of political regime are always 
vague and permeable. Now it seems practical to sort the economic elite posi-
tions into subgroups where the individuals may have common interests and 
                                                             
31  Laki-Szalai 2004, 126. 
32  In the sample there were 42 responding from the economic elite (4 bankers, 29 company 
manager from the largest companies and 9 leader of chambers of employers) Lengyel 2008. 
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action potential. According to the dimensions discussed in point 1. (sector, 
institutional ownership, personal position) the economic elite segments may be 
the described according the followings:  
- economic policy-makers, 
- managers of big state owned companies, and public institutions, 
- managers of multinationals, and FDI companies, 
- bankers, 
- most influential national entrepreneurs, 
- business elites 
i. client capitalists and “privatizators”, 
ii. market based industrialists. 
The interests of these different elite segments are quite diverse. What is in-
teresting from this paper’s point of view is how the interest of the elite seg-
ments are reconciled, with the consequences of high redistribution and strong 
presence of foreign capital. Although the two aspects seem fairly independent I 
assume that the interests of the different segments themselves connect them. 
The high foreign presence in the economy33 may indirectly and paradoxically 
underpin the strong state position and high redistribution which is apparently 
not prevailing in the interest of genuine welfare services. As a self defense 
against foreign capital, the political elite (and the related business elite seg-
ments) wish to retain as extensive control in the economy as possible. The 
omnipotent state is an excellent instrument for this purpose. Another explana-
tion in line with this concept (it has been mentioned in some interviews), is that 
the only way of the fast (elite) appropriation or accumulation of capital is tap-
ping the state/municipality budgets. 
The common interests and action potential of the above listed groups in 
most cases are obvious and even quite transparent too, e.g. bankers or leaders 
of FDI companies. Although the economic policy-makers, managers of big 
state owned companies and public institutions have no formal (united) organi-
zation to represent them, their position may be still the strongest among the 
other elite groups. From the end of the 90’s these top positions have been under 
the direct control of the governing parties. The holders of the top positions in 
lot of cases have decisive role in the governing parties or powerful relationship 
with a party leader. Anyway, they are part of the insulated trust network of a 
political party which governs or will govern soon. On the other hand it is worth 
discussing the interests positions of the typical business groups. 
                                                             
33  Apart from the banking sector, the real estate development is also dominated by foreign 
investors and developers irrespectively of the fact that one-fourth of the publicly richest 
Hungarians made his fortune in this sector. 
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c) Most Influential National Entrepreneurs 
Studying the Hungarian elite one cannot avoid to be very concrete in some 
cases because these (group of persons) have probable direct effect on the insti-
tutional framework, the patterns of elite behavior and the generally accepted 
rules of conduct (in the elite). Among the most obvious and visible cases it is 
worth selecting the managers-owners of OTP and MOL. 
OTP is the largest Hungarian bank, representing ca. 26% of all banking as-
sets and 37,5 % of banking profits in 2007.34 In some sectors (e.g. retail bank-
ing) OTP still retains more than a 50% market share. It is listed on BSE and 
approximately 70% of its shares are held by foreign investors. The manage-
ment is said to hold around 15% of the stocks. 
MOL (energy sector, oil and gas) is the largest Hungarian company (to-
gether with TVK which is controlled by MOL), it has around 11% of the net 
sales of the 200 largest companies. It is listed on BSE and approximately the 
80% of its shares are held by foreign investors. The management holds an 
undisclosed share of the stocks.  
Their common characteristics are as follows. They: 
- have substantial and decisive size in their sector, 
- are owned by foreign institutional investors, 
- are controlled by the domestic managers,  
- have intense connection to the political elite, 
- have monopolistic position in their sector,  
- are highly profitable, 
- went trough a special privatization with management participation and 
options, 
- have personal interlocks in the boards, and partially undisclosed hold-
ings,  
- enjoy reliable backing by the actual government,  
- the main political parties have delegated (although not formally) repre-
sentatives on their boards and among the directors. 
The influence of the few dozen elite persons around them could be assessed 
through how quickly and easily they are able to persuade the legislation or the 
government to enact a law even if it may not be entirely in accordance with the 
EU rules.35 Their apparent close connection to the state, and their incumbent 
positions on the other hand provides a solid support to existing elite configura-
                                                             
34  Source: PSZÁF Aranykönyv 2007. 
35  See “Lex Mol” a swift legislation to defend MOL against OMV partial takeover bid. At the 
very beginning of the financial crisis in 2008, likely under the pressure of OTP (and of 
course some other banks) the government hastily issued a guaranty for all (!) deposit with-
out upper limit. Similarly market restricting and EU rules negligent legislation went 
through in electricity sector in 2009. All of them went through with the unanimous agree-
ment of the main political parties. 
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tion. An ubiquitous and omnipotent state is the most effective device to serve 
their interests. These largest industrialist are not connected to any particular 
political side, but to all. They are beyond any media inquiry, their businesses’ 
interests are so significant, their associations and relationships are so wide-
spread that both politicians and the media tend to regard their businesses as 
“national interests”. 
d) Business Elites 
Apart from the most influential and visible groups the identification of the 
domestic business elite within the given institutional framework (strong foreign 
presence and an all-powerful state) raises some unique question. Does this 
group exist at all? Could we qualify the known “big entrepreneurs” as elite as 
they are not controlling the majority of the biggest 200 Hungarian companies? 
What is the proof that they are able to influence the reproduction of society? 
The so called top entrepreneurs are generally not ready to be visible even to 
anonymous scientific research.36 Without a clear sociological convention as to 
the identification of elites (the positional, reputational etc. approaches all have 
relevance) especially in transition countries, it seems rational to follow exam-
ples of the researches facing similar problems in post-socialist states and that is 
the various lists of 50/100 richest people.37 
One of the available lists38 of the wealthiest Hungarians has been published 
by a daily economic newspaper since 2002. This list – as any other of this kind 
of lists – has its limitations. The omissions are not entirely transparent, if 
somebody is not too keen to be visible, can easily be omitted from the list. 
According to the policy of the editors, any legally questionable wealth is also 
omitted, whose owners may also be interesting from the point of view of the 
elite. The general belief, namely, that there is an invisible pair to this list, is 
probably not too far from the truth. The people on this list therefore do not 
represent the Hungarian business elite as such, but only those top entrepre-
neurs, who are fearless enough to “go public”.39 
To asses the weight of these people in the economic elite, it is worth consid-
ering the list of the largest 200 companies and the richest 100 individuals. The 
cross section of the two lists shows that 15 of the largest companies are con-
trolled by entrepreneurs also on the list of the richest people (see Appendix, 
                                                             
36  Laki-Szalai 2004, 22. 
37  Machonin 2007, Weselowski 2007. 
38  More newspaper publish such list, here I use the list of the “Napi Gazdaság” because it has 
been publishing it since 2002, and with a relatively constant selection methodology, with 
Hungarian citizens, only with transparent and legal wealth. 
39  The list is” a manipulated reality show.” Claims a well known sociologist (E. Szalai). That 
is probably too negative description, the problems of the list preparation clearly illustrate an 
interesting aspect: the lack of the value consensus in the society. 
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Table 3). The owners of the remaining ten domestic private companies (from 
the top 200 companies) are not on this list. It is probably right to consider this 
cross section: being among the wealthiest and at the same time controlling one 
of the 200 biggest enterprises as being part of the elite. Which sectors provide 
the best opportunities to be wealthy? Real estate development, construction (25 
cases) and the financial sector (15 cases) dominate the transparent domestic 
path to become wealthy.40 What did these people do before 1990. In the case of 
the 2007 list I narrowed the analysis to 77 persons, being at least 45 years old 
in 2007 or 28 in 1990. (The average age of the people on the list was 53 years.) 
Most of them, 45 of 77, were some kind of an entrepreneur even before 1990. It 
is not a surprise because from the beginning of the 1980s it was relatively easy 
in Hungary to start “capitalistic” ventures. Ten of the 77 had middle or lower 
positions in ministries or banks and 19 of the 77 had an employment back-
ground at a larger state owned enterprise. It is remarkable that only 5 of them 
had a clear elite position before the transition.41 
Having in mind that this public list of wealthy people represents only the 
visible part of the new top capitalist class it would be difficult to draw any 
serious conclusion without further detailed investigation. It is possible never-
theless to explore what the elites think about the common beliefs, prejudices 
and biases frequently emerging in the world of media. According to the inter-
views completed so far (12-14 case) the business elite may be sorted into two, 
more or less distinct subgroups. The first of these groups is the so called party-
client capitalist. This group of people has a very close connection to the politi-
cal parties, they rely on public contracts and special licenses and play a crucial 
role in financing the parties. One can find them on both national and regional 
(local) level. Similar subgroup is the so called “privatizators”. They acquired 
their fortune or the decisive part of that through not too transparent privatiza-
tion transactions. Political parties rely considerably on these groups’ support 
because of the relatively limited legal party financing possibilities. On the one 
hand this situation is a bit “uncomfortable” to the big parties (and disastrous 
from the ethical point of view to the country as a whole), on the other it was 
just this system that has created an effective entry barrier against any new 
political initiative in the last 20 years. 
The second business segment is the market entrepreneurs, who are more or 
less independent, their businesses have nothing or not too much to do with 
public contracts, parties or municipalities, and who are keen not to be “in-
volved” beyond the generally accepted level of corruption. (The empirical 
research faces severe barriers approaching these topics. Even in the looser 
atmosphere of the interviews it is not possible to get any concrete information.) 
However, it is a new tendency that there are no strict walls among these clus-
                                                             
40  See Table 4. 
41  Detailed list in Table 4. 
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ters and these business groups are getting closer to each other slowly, sooner or 
later the distinctive role of the origin of the wealth seems to fade away. 
e) Symbiosis: Economic elite and the State 
Since by definition the high taxation and state redistribution greatly reduce the 
freedom economic actors, one of the the questions is how profitable operation 
is possible under these circumstances, how can the entrepreneurs succeed to 
retain enough resources to an adequate level capital of accumulation, mean-
while the domestic business groups have additionally faced the strong inci-
dence of the foreign, multinational competition. Another question is how elite 
interests and conflicts are reconciled by the political (and administrative) elite. 
How are they able to compensate the different business elite segments? 
Due to the obvious interlock between the political and certain domestic 
business elite groups – the most influential national entrepreneurs, client capi-
talists and “privatizators” – the “state connection” provides the unique oppor-
tunity, in a formally disadvantageous taxing system, for a thriving business 
operation. In the last ten years from the elite appropriation point of view the 
significance of the privatization of state owned enterprises gradually are fading 
away as the number of salable companies are diminishing, new methods of 
“compensation” emerged. The most important among these opportunities are 
the purchase orders for central and local government, and public institutions 
together with the PPP contracts. The EU accession provided further means for 
the political elite to eliminate the devastating effects of the high taxing level. 
The centrally and politically controlled distribution of EU convergence subsi-
dies (approximately EUR 23 billion between 2007-2013) grants that selected 
enterprises and businesses make sound profits. The importance of this channel 
is well palpable. By the end of 2006 – during and behind the toughest ever 
political (media) struggle between the main political fraction since 1990 – the 
political parties were able to agree quite rapidly on the division of the of the 
cake, and have hastily erected politically balanced network of institutions to 
distribute the EU monies. Moreover the pure size of the domestic companies 
involved provides substantial benefits in the presence of substantial entry barri-
ers. The heavy burden of massive administration requirements and regulation 
cannot be handled without extensive apparatuses which are indispensable to 
access the world of subsidies, state/EU tenders and various tax allowances. In 
these benefits the domestic “big” capitalists seek and find compensation for the 
strong presence of foreign capital, too. There are several further and even less 
transparent means political elite may use. On the local level the most important 
among these are the non transparent, negotiable local zoning regulations (hid-
den assets for the municipalities) which have provided singular opportunities 
for preferred real estate developers resulting their strong presence on the 
wealthiest list. The prevailing regulation is formed in a way that a municipality 
is (compare to the average of OECD countries Hungary has 5,6 times more of 
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these authorities per capita) de facto independent from any formal central gov-
ernment control. The only governance is carried out directly by the political 
parties. 
Traditionally, financial sector is more closed and better organized than other 
branches. This is especially true for the Hungarian financial elite groups. In the 
late 80’s their role was rather constructive, as outcome of the relatively fast 
privatization and opening up of the financial market. The expertise imported by 
the new financial institutions has greatly contributed to expansion of the finan-
cial discipline, and the improvement of corporate governance. However, on the 
other hand, they were able to maintain effective oligopoly, asymmetric regula-
tion (even today banks are free to change the key conditions of a credit agree-
ment) with weak consumers’ interest protection and low level of competition in 
retail banking services. Time to time there is a heated discussion that banks are 
the real beneficiaries of the housing finance subsidies. The fact is that by 2002-
2007 Hungarian banks’ ROA and ROE levels were more than two times higher 
than the Euro region banks’ indexes. It seems that financial sector can easily 
shift the burden of high redistribution and taxation and even bad debts on its 
consumers. The extreme high level of foreign ownership in this sector (above 
80%) virtually makes the financial elite members untouchable to the political 
elite and in the same time provides excellent bargaining position to this elite 
segment.  
The managers of state owned companies and public institutions are obvious 
beneficiaries of the high redistribution. They have the easiest access to state 
and municipality budgets and due to the meager financial and business control 
as well as the soft budget constraints their reproduction and appropriation pros-
pects are ideal under the given circumstances. One of the most important 
sources of appropriation is the outsourcing profitable line of businesses (espe-
cially in healthcare services). Corruption is the other important source of this 
segment’s capital accumulation, however this phenomena is deeply intermin-
gled with the political parties’ financing. Probably the great number of corrup-
tion scandals unfolding in the media is because of the upcoming elections 
2010, nevertheless this indicates the likely magnitude of this channel. Person-
ally this groups are fairly segmented, the local and branch interests crosscutting 
sometimes even central political objectives, they stand closest to the political 
elite. The main criterion of their recruitation is loyalty to the delegating party 
rather than expertise. Due to this situation and the lack of countrywide organ-
ized assemblies their common interests are seldom expressed like the bankers’ 
or big entrepreneurs’ concerns. Apparently they are in fierce contention for the 
budget sources, just because of this they are the most enthusiastic advocates of 
the outsized state notion. They are ready to back up any government action to 
increase the public contributions. 
The managers (and owners) of multinationals, and FDI companies are well 
organized and often backed by related ambassadors. Their companies are used 
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to operate in socialist countries and practically in all kind of regimes. The high 
level of redistribution is easily counterbalanced by their strong position acquir-
ing preferential tax treatment, tax holidays, legal monopolies, exclusive li-
censes (e.g. in energy, telecommunication sector) or even profit guaranties 
(energy sector). These managers are generally more qualified, and better 
trained than the other business segments’ top executives ( bankers are partly 
overlapping) and for them it is really obvious how state (budget) can be prob-
lematic an overwhelming. Nonetheless their and their companies’ interests are 
better served if their preferential position is maintained as more competitive 
environment might jeopardize their prospects. 
The various economic elite segments discussed above have learned and 
evolved to coexist with high state redistribution. Formally all “compensations” 
to various elite segments are in contradiction of a capitalistic economic theory, 
the formal and legal institutions and the “watchdogs” of the country, but the 
political elite so far was able to disarm any attempt to change the established 
status quo42. 
4. Conclusions 
It may be practical to extend the analysis of the Hungarian elite configuration 
beyond the competing political fractions and to identify and examine the vari-
ous (business) elite segments. The elite segments are the natural reflections of 
the given institutional background. The question of united or disunited elites 
maybe relevant in this (economic) dimension, too. If we intend to understand 
what the Hungarian elite’s responsibility is today, the two dimensional investi-
gation (political fractions, and economic elite segments) may provide a deeper 
understanding of the problems and trajectory of the Hungarian society. The 
various elite segments do have their particular interests and are able to act on a 
similar way as fractions do. The Hungarian examples show that elite segments 
may act independently from the (political) fractions but they are able to act 
together with one or more political fractions, too.43 The very loud rivalry in the 
political arena often sheds light on the contests and settlements among elite 
segments. Unfortunately, these contests and settlements are very seldom trans-
                                                             
42  Probably it is not a pure accident, that in the last 15 years there were no change in the 
management of the Competition Authority and the leader of the State Audit Office has been 
not changed in the last 20 years irrespective of which party happened to be in governing 
position. 
43  An independent or politically neutral action was the legislation to defend MOL in 2008 
sponsored by the most influential industrialist. The health care referendum in 2007 repre-
sented a case when an elite segment openly tried and succeeded assures its interests in con-
cert with a political fraction. 
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parent and normally closed to any (even sociological) investigation. Hopefully, 
qualitative studies may assist in making the picture a bit more precise. 
The Hungarian example seems to portray a case that even among very di-
verse elite segments it is possible to achieve settlements. Undoubtedly, these 
settlements have their merits and also problems. The societal consequences 
mentioned earlier are obviously in close connection with the compromises 
among elite segments and political fractions. 
It is highly probable that elite’s decisions have profound effects on the insti-
tutional framework of a country and the differences between the countries 
discussed in this paper can be traced back to certain elite preferences and deci-
sions in the 1990s. The Czech, Poland, and Slovak institutional frameworks 
have clear differences compared to the Hungarian but of course they all have 
their trade-offs. The external conditions being similar – 45 years of socialist 
history, gradually increasing connection to the West European economies in 
the 1980s – the elite “connection” seems inevitable. On the one hand it shows 
that the path dependence is not that decisive, different trajectories are possible, 
on the other hand one must take into consideration that in the beginning of the 
1990s the internal structures were quite fluid thus providing more options to 
elites. Nowadays the elite configurations are more stable, they have crystallized 
to a great extent since 1990. The Hungarian empirical data show the elite is 
closing down44 indicating that the elite configuration is stabilized and at the 
same time the path dependence (the institutional frames ) may be more com-
manding. The purpose of my (research) paper is to argue that the Hungarian 
transition case noticeably deviates from the other central European economies, 
and the existing elite configuration is in close relation and interaction with this 
deviation. Hopefully, further interviews will result more grounded hypothesizes 
compare to the preliminary statements of this paper. 
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44  “As for the pace and depth of the replacement of the elite, compared to the marked changes 
in the late 1980s, signs of deceleration and closing down were discerned in the latter half of 
the nineties. Another sign of slowing and consolidation was the growth of the rate of older 
leaders in the whole of the elite.” (Lengyel 2007, 111). 
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Table 2: FDI positions by partner country 
Type of FDI IN: Inward 
Currency million USD: US dollars 
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Reporting country 
Czech 
Republic 21.647 27.093 38.672 45.286 57.255 60.662 79.841 110.095 
Hungary 22.856 27.378 36.213 48.345 62.624 61.286 121.004 179.979 
Poland 34.227 41.247 47.900 57.851 86.634 90.752 125.597 175.851 
Slovak 
Republic 4.503 5.734 8.594 12.371 21.881 23.655 33.612 40.702 
 
2007 Population capita 
GDP 
M USD FDI/GDP % 
000 
USD/Capita 
Czech Republic 10.252 248.025 44,4% 10,74 
Hungary 10.050 189.038 95,2% 17,91 
Poland 37.988 613.318 28,7% 4,63 
Slovak Republic 5.390 108.355 37,6% 7,55 
2007     
Reporting country 
Australia   41,8%  
Austria   …  
Belgium   ….  
Canada   39,9%  
Czech Republic   44,4%  
Denmark   80,4%  
Finland   48,3%  
France   52,1%  
Germany   …  
Greece   16,7%  
Hungary   95,2%  
Iceland   107,7%  
Ireland   98,6%  
Italy   20,1%  
Japan   3,1%  
Korea   …  
Luxembourg   187,7%  
Mexico   …  
Netherlands   112,7%  
New Zealand   61,8%  
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Table 2 continued… 
Norway   …  
Poland   28,7%  
Portugal   47,2%  
Slovak Republic   37,6%  
Spain   42,5%  
Sweden   84,2%  
Switzerland   109,4%  
Turkey   16,4%  
United Kingdom   62,1%  
United States   15,2%  
Source: OECD Statistics. 
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Table 3: Cross Section of 200 Largest Hungarian Enterprise 2007 and 100 
Richest Individuals 
Rank Without Financial Institutions M HUF Ownership Rank Name 
34 Hungaropharma Gyógyszerke-reskedelmi Zrt. 194.501 Domestic 16 Béres Family 
61 Vegyépszer cégcsoport 107.037 Domestic 8 Nagy Elek 
62 IKR Termelésfejlesztési és Kereskedelmi Zrt. 104.469 Domestic 64 Saxon Attila 
70 Waberer’s Holding Zrt./Waberer’s Cégcsoport 89.640 Domestic 7 Wáberer Gy. 
76 Videoton Holding Zrt. 81.528 Domestic 5 Széles Gábor1 
84 Betonút Szolgáltató és Építő Zrt. 74.293 Domestic 10 Dunai György 
105 Axiál Javító, Kereskedelmi és Szolgáltató Kft. 53.406 Domestic 57 Harsányi Zsolt 
106 Market Csoport 52.743 Domestic 6 Veres Tibor 
112 KÉSZ Közép-Európai Építő és Szerelő Kft. 52.127 Domestic 65 Varga Mihály 
116 MAL Magyar Alumínium Termelő és Kereskedelmi Zrt. 49.567 Domestic 22 Tolnay Lajos
2 
118 Nitrogénművek Vegyipari Zrt. 48.210 Domestic 9 Bige László 
130 Pick Szeged Szalámigyár és Húsüzem Zrt. 45.538 Domestic 2 Csányi Sándor
3 
156 System Consulting Befekt., Fejl. és Ker. Zrt. 38.058 Domestic 68 Kapolyi László 
186 Masped Zrt. 32.189 Domestic 59 Kautz István 
187 Zwack Unicum Csoport* 32.078 Public 29 Zwack Péter 
1 Also:14. Lakatos Péter, 17.Sinkó Ottó,  2 26. Petrusz Béla, 3 CEO and minority owner of OTP 
Bank. 
* Public company controlled by Hungarian management. 
 
State owned company 13 
Domestic owner and control ( among the 100 Wealthiest) 14 
Domestic owner and control  9 
Public listed company, controlled by Hungarian management 6 
Public listed company controlled by FDI 4 
FDI controlled company 153 
Other (under liquidation) 1 
Total 200 
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Table 4: 100 Richest Hungarians 2007 
Employment position before 1990  
Age: 44 years or less 21 
Government, banks 10 
State owned companies 19 
Entrepreneurial background 48 
Other 2 
 
Sector of activity  
Real Estate, Constr. 25 
Financial 15 
Other 60 
 
Table 5: Life Expectancy and Redistribution in some OECD Countries 2003. 
Total Government Expenditure / 
Gross domestic product 
Life expectancy 
 TGE/GDP years  
AUSTRALIA 35,06% 80,3 AUS 
AUSTRIA 51,06% 78,6 AUT 
BELGIUM 51,15% 78,1 BEL 
CANADA 41,19% 79,7 CAN 
CZECH REPUBLIC 47,32% 75,3 CZE 
DENMARK 55,32% 77,2 DNK 
FINLAND 50,05% 78,5 FIN 
FRANCE 53,37% 79,4 FRA 
GERMANY 48,49% 78,4 DEU 
GREECE 48,99% 78,1 GRC 
HUNGARY 49,06% 72,4 HUN 
ICELAND 46,54% 80,7 ISL 
IRELAND 33,50% 77,8 IRL 
ITALY 48,33% 79,9 ITA 
JAPAN 38,51% 81,8 JPN 
KOREA 30,86% 76,9 KOR 
LUXEMBOURG 42,28% 78,2 LUX 
NETHERLANDS 47,10% 78,6 NLD 
NEW ZEALAND 38,12% 78,7 NZL 
NORWAY 48,44% 79,5 NOR 
POLAND 44,62% 74,7 POL 
PORTUGAL 45,84% 77,3 PRT 
SLOVAK REPUBLIC 39,38% 73,9 SVK 
SPAIN 38,24% 80,5 ESP 
Average 44,70% 78,1  
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POL
PRT DNK
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NOR FRA
TGE/GDP
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